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PsychosisDopamine is implicated in a diverse range of cognitive functions including cognitive ﬂexibility, task switching,
signalling novel or unexpected stimuli as well as advance information. There is also longstanding line of thought
that links dopaminewith belief formation and, crucially, aberrant belief formation in psychosis. Integrating these
strands of evidence would suggest that dopamine plays a central role in belief updating and more speciﬁcally in
encoding ofmeaningful information content in observations. The precise nature of this relationship has remained
unclear. To directly address this question we developed a paradigm that allowed us to decompose two distinct
types of information content, information-theoretic surprise that reﬂects the unexpectedness of an observation,
and epistemic value that induces shifts in beliefs or, more formally, Bayesian surprise. Using functional magnetic-
resonance imaging in humans we show that dopamine-rich midbrain regions encode shifts in beliefs whereas
surprise is encoded in prefrontal regions, including the pre-supplementary motor area and dorsal cingulate cor-
tex. By linking putative dopaminergic activity to belief updating these data provide a link to false belief formation
that characterises hyperdopaminergic states associated with idiopathic and drug induced psychosis.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Adaptive behaviour mandates agents build models of their environ-
ment and use these to appropriately update their beliefs about the
causes of sensory information, a process formalised within Bayesian
brain theories (Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Friston et al., 2014b; Friston,
2010; Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Tenenbaum et al., 2006). It has
long been proposed that dopamine plays an important role in belief for-
mation and, crucially, in aberrant belief formation in psychosis (Corlett
et al., 2009; Howes et al., 2009; Howes et al., 2011a, 2011b; Kapur, 2003;
Roiser et al., 2013; Shaner, 1999). This view is supported by studies in-
dicating that dopamine is critical for cognitive ﬂexibility (Bestmann
et al., 2014; van Holstein et al., 2011) and task switching (Cools et al.,
2009; Stelzel et al., 2010). It also resonates with observations showing
dopamine neurons respond to both novel and unexpected stimuli
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Bunzeck and Düzel, 2006; Horvitz,
2000; Iglesias et al., 2013) and reﬂect preferences for advance informa-
tion (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009). These ﬁndings suggest
that dopamine plays a central role in belief updating and, therefore, inscience, University of Salzburg,
(P. Schwartenbeck).
. This is an open access article underencoding the meaningful information content of observations. Despite
these lines of suggestive evidence, a relationship between dopamine
signalling and belief-updating in humans has not been demonstrated
so far.
To examine this question we deﬁned two related, but distinct, mea-
sures of information content that could be signalled by dopamine. The
ﬁrst quantity is surprise or surprisal (Barto et al., 2013) and reﬂects the in-
formation content of a stimulus in a purely information-theoretic sense.
For an observation o given amodelmwith parameters θ this is deﬁned as:
−lnP ojθ;mð Þ:
This is the negative log probability of an observation, which reﬂects
the simple unexpectedness of an observation given an agent's model of
the world. Importantly, this does not necessarily index the ‘usefulness’
of information to an agent, leading to the so-called ‘white noise’ para-
dox, where maximally informative stimuli are those that are entirely
random and therefore meaningless for updating an agent's model
about theworld (Barto et al., 2013). Consequently, a surprising observa-
tion is not necessarily associated with improving an agent's beliefs
about the environment.
This motivates an alternative deﬁnition of information in terms of
actual shifts in beliefs. Formally, this corresponds to Bayesian surprisethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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about the world:
KL P θð jo;mÞjjP θjmð Þ½ Þ:
Bayesian surprise can be understood as meaningful information
or the ‘epistemic value’ of an observation (Friston et al., 2015). This
quantity has previously been used successfully to model visual
search behaviour (Itti and Baldi, 2009) and exploration (Sun et al.,
2011).
Since model updating occurs in response to unexpected observa-
tions, inmany situations information-theoretic surprise and shifts in be-
liefs are highly correlated. However, they are decorrelated in situations
where surprising stimuli do not lead to signiﬁcant model updating, as
occurs when an observation is similarly unlikely under all possible
hypotheses. We exploited this fact to develop a task in which subjects
were asked to infer, on a trial-by-trial basis, whether a visual or audi-
tory cue determined the current probabilities of observing different
trial outcomes (see Fig. 1a). Subjects were instructed, truthfully,
that on any given trial outcomes were exclusively determined by
one of the cue types (i.e., sensory modalities), and that this contin-
gency would switch periodically. At the end of each trial, they were
asked to rate their belief about the current contingency, on a visual
analogue scale ranging from 1 (complete certainty that visual cues
determined outcomes) to 11 (complete certainty that auditory out-
comes did) (see Fig. 1b for an example trial). To allow us to clearly
separate BOLD responses engendered by reward processing from
those relating to information content, we used monetary gains and
losses as outcomes. These outcomes determined subject's earnings
at the end of the experiment, but were independent of performance
on the rating task.Fig. 1. Task. (A) Subjects were instructed that throughout the experiment one ‘good’ shape an
cue-validity. Monetary outcomes varied between ∓10 and ∓30 pence. (B) Each trial started w
followed by a trial outcome (win or loss). Based on this observation, subjects were asked to infe
on a rating bar. At any given trial, only one modality predicted the outcome. (C) Subjects were
with about 5–6 reversal of contingencies during one session (consisting of 60 trials). (D) Be
(red line) without reﬂecting an actual shift in cue contingencies (blue line).Materials and methods
Participants
27 subjects (16 females) with no known history of psychiatric
or neurological disorders provided written informed consent and par-
ticipated in the study. Participants had a mean age of 24.9 (standard
deviation=5.28, range= [19,43]) andwere recruited from theUniver-
sity College London Psychology Subject Pool. Subjects were instructed
that they would be paid between £25 and £35, determined by the
sum of their earnings in one behavioural training session and three
sessions in the scanner. The average payment of subjects was £33.78.
The study was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee.
Procedure
Participants underwent a 1-h training period followed by one and a
half hours of scanning. In the experiment, subjects had to infer on a trial-
by-trial basis whether auditory or visual cues currently determined
probabilities of seeing a speciﬁc trial outcome,where the cue contingen-
cies switched periodically (about 5 to 6 times in one session). Trial out-
comes were wins or losses varying randomly between 10 and 30 pence.
Subjects were instructed that on any given trial only one of the two
cue types (visual or auditory) predicted outcomes while the other had
no predictive validity. In an initial training session subjects learned
that in both the visual and auditory domains there were one “good”
cue that was predictive of a monetary win and one ‘bad’ cue that was
predictive of a monetary loss, where cues had a validity of 90%. Subjects
were instructed that these contingencies would remain constant
throughout the experiment, such that the identity of the ‘bad’ tone
and shape, predictive of a monetary loss, and the ‘good’ tone and
shape, predictive of a monetary win, remained the same. Crucially,d tone predicted a monetary win and one ‘bad’ shape and tone predicted a loss with 90%
ith a simultaneous presentation of one shape (good or bad) and one tone (good or bad),
r whether visual or auditory cues currently predict trial outcomes and indicate their belief
instructed that cue contingencies did not change on a trial-by-trial basis but periodically,
cause cues had only 90% validity, sometimes unexpected trial-outcomes were observed
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gencies, not on the valence of cues (good or bad).
In the actual task, each trial startedwith a simultaneous presentation
of one visual (good or bad) and one auditory (good or bad) cue, follow-
ed by a trial outcome (monetary win or loss). Based on this observation,
subjects had to infer whether auditory or visual information was
currently predictive of trial outcomes and rate their belief on a scale
ranging from 1 (complete certainty that one modality determined out-
comes) to 11 (complete certainty that the other modality did), where
the sides on which ‘Shape’ and ‘Tone’ would appear on the rating bar
were counterbalanced between subjects. Importantly, half of the trials
were informative (one cue being predictive of a win whereas the
other being predictive of a loss) whereas the other half was uninforma-
tive (both cues being good or bad). This introduced a crucial dissociation
between unexpected events (i.e., information-theoretic surprise) and
actual shifts in beliefs (Bayesian surprise) that could take place in infor-
mative trials only, while decorrelating these two measures of informa-
tion content from actual reward.
To thoroughly train subjects on the contingencies of the task, one full
training session was performed prior to the actual experiment in the
scanner, preceded by a training session on the valence of the cues
(i.e., learning which cue was predictive of a win/loss) and a session in
which cues had 100% validity to familiarise subjects with the general
structure of the task.
Subjects performed three sessions consisting of 60 trials in the MRI
Scanner. Each trial started with the presentation of the cues lasting
for 2000 ms followed by a gap jittered between 2000 and 8000 ms.
Subsequently, an outcome was shown for 2000 ms. After the outcome,
a rating bar appeared for 4000 ms where subjects had to indicate
their beliefs using a MRI-compatible button box. This was followed by
an interstimulus-interval (ﬁxation cross) jittered between 1000 and
3000 ms.
Computational modelling
To derive trial-by-trial regressors for information-theoretic surprise
and belief updating, we developed a simplemodel that performs Bayes-
ian belief updating at each trial.We assume that subjects' prior beliefs at
the beginning of a session regard both hidden states to be equally likely:
t ¼ 1: P θjmð Þ ¼ vision sound½  ¼ 0:5 0:5½  : ð1Þ
The likelihood of a given outcomedepended on the observed audito-
ry and visual cues (Cv, Ca), which could be good or bad, and a subject's
individual belief about the validity of a cue τ (free parameter):
P ot jθ;mð Þ ¼ ot  τ  Cv ot  1−τð Þ  Caot  1−τð Þ  Cv ot  τ  Ca
 
: ð2Þ
The posterior belief about cue contingencies is obtained by an appli-
cation of Bayes rule at any given trial:
P θjot ;mð Þ ¼ P θjmð Þ  P ot jθ;mð ÞX
P θjmð Þ  P ot jθ;mð Þð Þ
: ð3Þ
The posterior belief at a given trial then serves as a prior belief at the
subsequent trial:
t þ 1: P θjmð Þ ¼ P θjot ;mð Þ  E ð4Þ
where E encodes subjects' expectations about the frequency of contin-
gency reversal depending on reversal probability δ:
E ¼ δ 1−δ1−δ δ
 
: ð5ÞWe estimated the two free parameters τ and δ using (constrained)
maximum-likelihood estimation, while constraining τ between 0.5
and 1 and δ between 0 and 1. To ﬁt our model to behaviour, we used
the estimated current belief about the cue contingencies as a predictor
for the observed rating and speciﬁed the ﬁtting algorithm (using the
Matlab-routine fmincon) to minimise the residuals in that linear
model (or, equivalently, maximise the explained variance R2 in ob-
served behaviour).
Based on this model-ﬁtting, we derived trial-by-trial measures
of shifts in beliefs formalised as Bayesian surprise, i.e., the Kullback–
Leibler divergence from prior to posterior beliefKL½Pðθjot ;mÞjjPðθjmÞ ¼
∑Pðθjot ;mÞ  log

Pðθjot ;mÞ
PðθjmÞ

as well as surprise deﬁned as− lnP(o|θ,m).Imaging data acquisition and analysis
We acquired T2*-weighted echo planar images (EPIs) by using a 32-
channel head coil at a 3-T Trio Siemens scanner at the Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging. We acquired a partial volume consisting of
42 3-mm slices in descending order (echo time: 0.065 ms, repetition
time: 2.940ms) at an angle of 30° in the anterior–posterior axis to opti-
mize sensitivity to prefrontal regions (Deichmann et al., 2003). Images
were acquired with a ﬁeld of view of 192 × 192 mm (matrix 64 × 64)
resulting in a notional in-plane resolution of 3 × 3 × 3 mm. In each
session, at least 245 volumes were acquired. An MR-compatible
button box recorded right index and middle ﬁnger presses to move
the cursor on the rating bar. Auditory cues were presented using MRI-
compatible headphones. Foam head-restraint pads were used to mini-
mise head movement and respiratory and cardiac activities were
measured and used as covariates in the imaging analysis. Whole-brain
1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm T1-weighted structural images were acquired
and coregistered with mean EPI images.
We performed preprocessing and all statistical analyses using
SPM12b (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK,
http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). To allow for T1 relaxation effects the
ﬁrst 6 functional images were discarded. fMRI time series were
realigned to the mean image and unwarped using ﬁeldmaps generated
by the Fieldmap toolbox as implemented in SPM12b (Hutton et al.,
2002). EPIs and structural scans were normalised and smoothed using
a 6 mm2 full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel using
the DARTEL toolbox (Ashburner, 2007), allowing the comparison of
data between subjects in common anatomical space.
To investigate for effects in the dopaminergic midbrain, we
used a hand drawn region of interest based on previous literature
(Schwartenbeck et al., 2014a) for small volume correction of our
fMRI analyses.
We conducted a standard mass-univariate analysis to interrogate
the data for model-based effects. We created a GLM with separate
events for ﬁxation crosses, cue onset, outcome presentation and rating
bar onset, modelled as stick functions with duration 0. The outcome re-
gressorwasmodulated by ﬁve additional parametric regressors, namely
surprise (z-scored), shifts in beliefs (KL-divergence, z-scored), the dif-
ference between estimated shifts in beliefs and the behavioural shift
in rating (z-scored), current monetary return and reward prediction
error, i.e., a mismatch between expected and observed reward, where
the former was deﬁned as the sum of the valence of the auditory and
visual cues multiplied by the current belief about cue contingencies as
indicated by subjects' rating at the previous trial. The full correlation
matrix for surprise, shifts in beliefs, monetary outcome and reward pre-
diction errors is displayed in Table 1. To control for any confounding
effects of reward anticipation or conﬁdence on effects at outcome pre-
sentation, we included subjects' current belief about the relevant mo-
dality (as indicated by the rating at the previous trial), the conﬁdence
of these beliefs as indicated by the cursor position at the previous trial,
expected (relevant) value (as described above) and expected irrelevant
Table 1
Correlationmatrix for surprise, shifts in beliefs, monetary outcome and reward prediction
errors (RPE).
Surprise Shifts in beliefs Monetary outcome RPE
Surprise 0.581 −0.001 0.008
Shifts in beliefs −0.006 −0.003
Monetary outcome 0.589
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cue is not relevant, as indicated by the rating at the previous trial) as
parametric regressors at cue onset. Furthermore, we included the num-
ber of button presses as parametric regressor on the rating regressor.
Note that we did not serially orthogonalise these regressors, thus
removing all shared variance from the analysis.
We additionally included motion, respiratory and cardiac informa-
tion as physiological covariates of no interest and included temporal de-
rivatives (ﬁrst-order differences) to account for slice-timing effects.
Furthermore, an AR (1) model was used to account for serial correla-
tions in the fMRI time series and we applied a 128-s cutoff high pass
ﬁlter.
A standard summary statistic approach was used to test for second-
level effects using one-sample t-tests on the estimated responses of the
ﬁrst-level (within-subject) analysis. Random ﬁeld theory was used to
correct for multiple comparisons.
Results
In a training period prior to the experiment, subjects learned that in
both visual and auditory domains one ‘bad’ cue predicted a monetary
loss whereas one ‘good’ cue predicted a monetary win, where cues
had a validity of 90%. Subjects were instructed that these contingencies
remained constant throughout the entire experiment. Thus, for theFig. 2.Difference between Bayesian and information-theoretic surprise. (A) Illustration of an inf
agent beliefs that visual information is relevant (thus expecting a win as a trial outcome). Obse
about cue contingencies, since the trial outcomewas correctly predicted by the tone but not by
(B) Conversely, two ‘good’ cues followedbya (unexpected) negative trial outcomewill not induc
Thus, despite the observation of an unexpected outcome the trial provides no meaningful infor
information-theoretic surprise (i.e., an unexpected outcome is observed), but only in informativ
ber of informative and uninformative trials, thus providing a decorrelation between informatioentire experiment subjects knew the identity of the ‘bad’ shape and
tone that predicted a probable loss, as well as the ‘good’ shape and tone
that predicted a probable win (stimulus contingencies are depicted in
Fig. 1a). Each trial started with a simultaneous presentation of one
of the two cues from the visual and auditory domains, followed by anout-
come, which was either a monetary win or loss (varying randomly be-
tween 10 and 30 pence). Current earnings were indicated by a progress
bar at the bottom of the screen.
The experiment was divided into 60 trial sessions, with reversals
occurring between ﬁve and six times in a session. Importantly, in half
of the trials the cues were uninformative, and both cues were either
good or bad (congruent valence of cues). In the other half of the trials
cues were informative, i.e. one cue was good and the other bad (incon-
gruent valence of cues), providing a decorrelation of information-
theoretic and Bayesian surprise (illustrated in Fig. 2).
Subjects underwent an extensive training period to familiarise
themselves with the task contingencies, in particular the approximate
frequency of reversals (see Methods for details). Subsequently, they
performed three sessions of the task during acquisition of fMRI data.
To analyse performance on the task, we developed a simple computa-
tional model that performs Bayesian belief-updating on a trial-by-trial
basis about which modality was currently relevant (model details are
depicted in Fig. 3a). To derive trial-by-trial regressors for the use in
the imaging analysis we ﬁt individual subjects' data using constrained
maximum-likelihood estimation, with subjects' beliefs about the valid-
ity of a cue and probability of contingency reversal as free parameters
(see Methods for details). We found that our simple model had high
accuracy in predicting subject's contingency-ratings (R2 = 0.82, 95%-
conﬁdence interval: [0.97, 0.76]) (see examples in Fig. 3b and Table 2
for a full list of all estimated parameters). Furthermore, we found a
high correlation between Bayesian surprise and observed shifts in
beliefs (r = 0.58, 95%-conﬁdence interval: [0.51, 0.64]). Note that the
aim of our computational model was to derive imaging regressors forormative trial with a shape predicting awin and a tone predicting a loss, assuming that the
rving a monetary loss will contradict the agent's expectations and induce a shift in beliefs
the shape. This is an illustration of a trial with high Bayesian surprise (i.e., a shift in beliefs).
e a shift in beliefs because the outcomewasneither predicted by the tone nor by the shape.
mation content and is thus completely uninformative. Note that both examples yield high
e trials actual shifts in beliefs can occur. Crucially, each session consisted of the same num-
n-theoretic and Bayesian surprise.
Fig. 3. Behaviouralmodelling. (A)We testedwhether subjects updated their beliefs optimally, i.e. updating prior beliefs about cue contingencies to posterior beliefs according to Bayes rule.
Note that P(vision) = 1− P(sound). We performed (constrained) maximum-likelihood estimation of subjects' expectation about the frequency of contingency reversal and about the
validity of cues. Posterior beliefs at one trial served as prior beliefs at the subsequent trial. (B) We found that our model accounted well for observed behaviour (R2 = 0.82), indicating
that subjects updated their beliefs at least close to optimally (difference of predicted and observed ratings is illustrated in two example subjects).
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did not compare a range of different models.
To check that subjects were able to adequately perform the task, we
correlated subjects' rating at the end of each trial with the true contin-
gencies and found moderate relationship contingencies (r = 0.54,
95%-conﬁdence interval: [0.61, 0.45]). This level of performance is in
linewith the challenging nature of our task. The fact that half of all trials
were uninformative, implying that only in half of the trials subjects
could actually infer on contingency reversals, naturally induces a delay
in tracking changes in current cue-contingencies. To account for this,
we additionally compared performance with that of an ideal Bayesian
observer (an instantiation of our behavioural model using the true
parameters of the task). We found a high correlation between the
ideal observer and subjects' performance (r = 0.78, 95%-conﬁdence
interval: [0.83, 0.71]), conﬁrming that subjects were able to perform
the task successfully.
We next derived, based on themodel-ﬁtting, trial-by-trial regressors
encoding information-theoretic surprise, epistemic value and reward
prediction errors, and examined their neuronal correlates. In particular
we were interested in whether one of these quantities was encoded in
midbrain regions commonly associated with dopaminergic function,
namely the Substantia Nigra pars compacta (SNc) and Ventral Tegmental
Area (VTA) (Düzel et al., 2009).
In keeping with our hypothesis, we found that dopamine-rich
midbrain regions encoded Bayesian surprise or epistemic value(small-volume corrected, peak MNI −6 −15 −10, PPeak b 0.001,
TPeak = 6.24 and peak MNI 10−18 −10, PPeak = 0.049, TPeak = 3.64
see Fig. 4a). To control for additional effects of belief updating beyond
estimated Bayesian surprise, we used the observed change in rating at
the end of each trial as an overt behavioural proxy for belief updating.
We included the difference between estimated Bayesian surprise and
the observed change in rating as an additional regressor to test whether
midbrain activity predicted shifts in beliefs over and above those pre-
dicted by ourmodel.We detected additional effects in the dopaminergic
midbrain for belief updating over and beyond our model predictions
(small-volume corrected, peak MNI −10 −20 −10, PPeak = 0.006,
TPeak = 4.65), suggesting that midbrain activity predicted ﬂuctuations
in behaviour over and above those predicted by the model. Further-
more, we replicated these effects in the midbrain in an additional anal-
ysis, where we used the actual observed shifts in rating as opposed to
the belief-updates as estimated by our model (small-volume corrected,
peakMNI−6−15−10, PPeak=0.03, TPeak=3.87 and, reaching trend-
signiﬁcance, peakMNI 12−18−10, PPeak=0.065, TPeak=3.48). Taken
together, both sets of ﬁndings provide convergent evidence that puta-
tive dopaminergic midbrain regions encode epistemic value, or mean-
ingful information, of a stimulus.
In a whole brain analysis, we found effects for the difference be-
tween behavioural rating and modelled shifts in beliefs in the inferior
frontal cortex (peak MNI 45 8 21, Pcluster b 0.001, TPeak = 4.84), the pos-
terior parietal cortex (peak MNI 40 −72 32, Pcluster = 0.006, TPeak =
Table 2
Model parameters. Individual beliefs about cue validity and expectations of reversal prob-
ability per session estimated individually based on observed behaviour.
Subject τsess 1 τsess 2 τsess 3 δsess 1 δsess 2 δsess 3
1 0.99 0.99 0.77 0.99 0.77 0.68
2 0.95 0.98 0.92 0.98 0.99 0.94
3 0.69 0.50 0.91 0.72 0.71 0.94
4 0.50 0.7 0.94 0.94 0.99 0.99
5 0.92 0.84 0.86 0.99 0.98 0.98
6 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.83 0.74 0.75
7 0.99 0.79 0.94 0.98 0.83 0.99
8 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.93
9 0.83 0.66 0.84 0.96 0.95 0.91
10 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
11 0.92 0.89 0.77 0.99 0.98 0.88
12 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.97 0.97 0.96
13 1.00 0.99 0.50 0.97 0.72 0.97
14 0.99 0.79 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.96
15 0.83 0.72 0.80 0.91 0.89 0.87
16 0.96 0.86 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00
17 0.68 0.78 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.94
18 0.88 0.95 0.86 0.96 0.96 0.90
19 0.95 0.96 0.67 0.97 0.97 0.89
20 0.55 0.50 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.99
21 0.97 0.72 0.97 0.96 0.84 0.95
22 0.82 0.89 0.99 0.97 0.98 1.00
23 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
24 0.92 0.87 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.89
25 0.96 1.00 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.86
26 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.95
27 0.74 0.73 0.81 0.97 0.95 0.97
583P. Schwartenbeck et al. / NeuroImage 125 (2016) 578–5865.05) and in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (peak MNI 6 27 27,
Pcluster b 0.001, TPeak = 5.27). This is in keeping with previous work
which also implicates these areas in model updating (O'Reilly et al.,
2013), and suggests possible cortical targets of, or inputs to, midbrain
neurons encoding epistemic value.Fig. 4. Imaging results. (A) Shifts in beliefs were encoded in dopamine-rich midbrain region
corrected, peak MNI −6 −15 −10, PPeak b 0.001, TPeak = 6.24 and peak MNI 10 −18 −
(B) Information-theoretic surprise was encoded in frontal regions including the dorsal cingu
0.01 and voxel extend threshold of 392 for display purposes).Next, we investigated whether individual differences in perfor-
mancewould relate to the effect size ofmidbrain activity formeaningful
information. As a measure of behavioural performance, we correlated
each subject's rating with the true contingencies at any given trial. As
a proxy for the effect size of the midbrain activation, we extracted indi-
vidual betas from the peak-voxel of the combined effects for estimated
and observed shifts in beliefs (peak MNI−9−20−12, PPeak = 0.02,
TPeak = 4.10). We found that this measure of performance correlated
negativelywith the effect size of activation inmidbrain regions for shifts
in beliefs (Spearman's Rho ρ=−0.44, p=0.02, see Fig. 5a), suggesting
that subjects who performed comparatively well in tracking the true
contingencies displayed decreased effects in midbrain regions for shifts
in beliefs. A similar result (reaching trend-signiﬁcance)was foundwhen
we tested the relationship between performance and the effect size of
midbrain activation using a correlation between subjects' behaviour
and the ideal observer model as measure of performance (Spearman's
Rho ρ=−0.36, p=0.07). This raises the intriguing possibility that in-
dividual differences in dopaminergic sensitivity to informative cues
might affect learning performance, which might explain the abnormal
belief formation that has been associatedwith dopaminergic abnormal-
ities (Howes and Kapur, 2009).
Consistent with previous ﬁndings, effects of information-theoretic
surprise were observed in a network of frontal regions including the
ventral pre-supplementarymotor cortex (pre-SMA) and dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (peak MNI 12 16 42, Pcluster b 0.001, TPeak = 4.86, see
Fig. 4b). This is in keepingwith the general idea of the brain as a predic-
tive organ (Dayan et al., 1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999), and supports a
distinction between the neuronal processing of meaningful information
and simple surprise.
We again tested whether individual differences in the effect size
of SMA/dorsal cingulate activation would relate to behavioural perfor-
mance. Intriguingly, we found a strong positive relationship between
behavioural performance and individual effect size of activation for
surprise (betas extracted from peak voxel MNI 12 16 42, see Fig. 5b),s including the Substantia Nigra compacta and Ventral Tegmental Area (small-volume
10, PPeak = 0.049, TPeak = 3.64; voxel extend threshold of 100 for display purposes).
late cortex (peak MNI 12 16 42, Pcluster b 0.001, TPeak = 4.86; image thresholded at p =
Fig. 5. Relationship between performance and midbrain as well as SMA/dACC activation. A) Subjects who were comparatively better (performance on x axis) at inferring the actual
cue contingencies displayed relatively less midbrain activation for shifts in beliefs compared to subjects who were worse at tracking these contingencies during the task. B) In contrast,
subjects who were comparatively good at tracking the cue contingencies showed higher activity in the SMA/dACC for information-theoretic surprise.
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(Spearman's Rho ρ = 0.48, p = 0.01) and the ideal observer
(Spearman's Rho ρ = 0.59, p = 0.001). Put simply, this implies that
subjects who were comparatively good at tracking the task contingen-
cies showed increased effect sizes of activation in the SMA/dACC for
information-theoretic surprise.
Finally, we tested for monetary outcome and reward prediction
error effects at outcome time, which are typically associated with activ-
ity in the dopaminergic midbrain and its targets such as the ventral stri-
atum(O'Doherty et al., 2004; Schultz, 2012; Schultz et al., 1997). Even at
a very liberal threshold of p b 0.05 uncorrectedwe did not detect effects
for those regressors in dopaminergic midbrain or striatal regions (see
Table 3 for details). While the absence of signiﬁcant effects cannot be
taken as evidence against the neuronal encoding of reward prediction
errors, these results are in line with the general structure of our para-
digm wherein subjects were over-trained on the task contingencies.
Speciﬁcally, subjects had to perform inference on the relevance of cues
based on trial-outcomes without a need to perform any kind of reward
learning. Our results suggest that, across subjects at least, the dopamine
system was if at all only weakly engaged by the reward component of
the task, compared with its epistemic aspects, most likely due to the
fact that the value per se of outcomes was irrelevant for guiding future
behaviour. This ﬁnding is in line with evidence that prediction re-
sponses to reward in regions such as the striatum are most prominent
in situations where they have relevance for on-going behaviour
(FitzGerald et al., 2014; Klein-Flügge et al., 2011).Table 3
Effects of reward prediction error on the whole brain level (reported for p b 0.05
uncorrected).
Region Cluster
size
FWE-corrected
p-value
T-value peak
voxel
Peak coordinates
(MNI)
X Y Z
Precentral
gyrus
317 0.001 5.22 33 −12 58Discussion
We provide evidence that activity in dopamine-rich midbrain
regions encodes the quantity of meaningful information imparted by a
stimulus. This is often referred to as its epistemic value (Friston et al.,
2015), deﬁned as the Kullback–Leibler divergence between beliefs be-
fore and after observing the stimulus. These results support suggestions
that dopaminergic rich regions play a key role in belief updating, consis-
tent with the broader notion that abnormal belief formation is associat-
ed with hyperdopaminergic function (Kapur, 2003). It also highlights
the importance of dopamine for the expression of cognitive ﬂexibility
(Bestmann et al., 2014; van Holstein et al., 2011). We also found evi-
dence for a dissociation between information-theoretic surprise,
which is mainly encoded in frontal regions, and actual shifts in beliefs
which are associated with activity in putatively dopaminergic midbrain
regions. Thus, in keeping with prior work, we show that information-
theoretic surprise was encoded in regions typically associated with in-
ternal conﬂict and task difﬁculty, such as the pre-SMA and dorsal cingu-
late cortex (Duncan, 2010; Kool and Botvinick, 2013).
In a post-hoc analysis, we detected a between-subject effect, such
that participants who were better at tracking the true contingencies
during the task displayed smaller effect sizes in terms of shifts in beliefs
induced activation within dopamine-rich midbrain regions. Specula-
tively, this might relate to the effort of tracking the true contingencies
or indeed the amount of meaningful information imparted by an obser-
vation, such that incoming information is more ‘meaningful’ to subjects
who perform poorly on tracking the true contingencies, requiring a
stronger update of beliefs compared to subjects whose beliefs in the
contingencies aremore accurate in theﬁrst place. Alternatively, subjects
who perform poorly in the task may be hypersensitive to unexpected
events and shift their beliefs too often, where this hypersensitivity is
reﬂected in stronger midbrain activation. In either case, our results
raise the possibility that inter-individual differences in dopaminergic
function drive altered belief formation, over and above any effects of
the dopamine system in signalling reward (Schultz et al., 1997). Intrigu-
ingly, we found the opposite pattern for effect sizes of activation for
information-theoretic surprise in the supplementary motor area and
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex: subjects who were comparatively
better at tracking the task contingencies showed higher activation for
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nations, this may indeed speak for a between-subjects anticipation ef-
fect: subjects who were better at anticipating and tracking reversals of
the task contingencies displayed attenuated effects in the midbrain,
which may reﬂect less requirement of an update or, put differently, ob-
servations may have become less meaningful with respect to the
subject's beliefs. Surprising events, however, cannot be anticipated —
and thus may elicit stronger effects in subjects who are better at track-
ing the true contingencies. Furthermore, this might also indicate that
subjects who performed poorly at tracking the true contingencies
found it harder to dissociate between surprising and meaningful infor-
mation, which is a promising topic for future investigations and transla-
tional approaches.
Existing work reports a dopaminergic response to novel and unex-
pected stimuli (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Bunzeck and Düzel,
2006; DeYoung, 2013; Horvitz, 2000). Since these stimuli will, in gener-
al, lead to signiﬁcant belief-updating (Barto et al., 2013) they should
also, on an epistemic value account of dopaminergic ﬁring, occasion sig-
niﬁcant responses. A key contribution of our study is to show, by sepa-
rating surprise from actual shifts in beliefs, that dopamine is sensitive
only tomeaningful information, rather than the simple unexpectedness
of a stimulus. This highlights an important role for dopamine in belief
formation over and above other proposed roles such as reward learning
(Schultz, 2012; Schultz et al., 1997), motivational salience (Berridge,
2007), exploration (DeYoung, 2013; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006)
and the precision of action selection (Friston et al., 2014a). Further,
the dissociation between surprise and meaningful information has
also been reported in the context of memory reconsolidation,
such that prediction error or surprisal has been shown to control the
balance between memory reconsolidation and newmemory formation
(Sevenster et al., 2014), highlighting the important interplay between
memory reconsolidation and dopamine function.
Our ﬁndings also resonate with previous work showing that dopa-
mine neurons encode reward uncertainty, displaying highest sensitivity
for maximal uncertainty, i.e. a probability of 0.5 for receiving a reward
(Fiorillo et al., 2003). Intuitively, it seems plausible that a shift in beliefs
relates to higher uncertainty about the environment and thus higher
uncertainty about the delivery of a reward. However, as displayed in
Fig. 2a, shifts of beliefs can also occur in informative trials when there
was relatively little uncertainty about the outcome. Furthermore, beliefs
can also shift towards conﬁrming current expectations about the cue
contingencies. In tasks where surprise and model updating are highly
correlated a surprising outcome will necessarily induce a shift in beliefs
as well as higher uncertainty about the task contingencies. The crucial
contribution of this study, however, is a dissociation of surprise frombe-
lief updates, showing that only the latter elicits midbrain activation
whereas the former is associated with effects in the SMA and dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex.
Our paradigm also relates to what has been reported as the
‘gambler's fallacy’ or the ‘Perruchet effect’. In brief, this fallacy reﬂects
a failure in acknowledging the independence of events in decision-
making paradigms, leading to the overestimation of the likelihood for
winning a gamble or receiving a shock as expressed in subjects' beliefs.
In contrast, previous work has provided evidence for a second, more
automated learning system expressed in the galvanic skin response,
which correctly tracks the true contingencies (McAndrew et al., 2012;
Weidemann et al., 2009). In our paradigm, however, subjects were
asked to track cue contingencies on a trial-by-trial basis where the inde-
pendence assumptionwas explicitly violated; the likelihood for a rever-
sal of cue contingencies increased with ongoing time. Therefore, the
question of interest becomes how subjects actually represent the
‘non-independence’ of trials in such situations.While this is an interest-
ing question, testing this would be beyond the scope of the present
study, which aimed at dissociating belief updates due to meaningful in-
formation and thepure unexpectedness of anobservation as reﬂected in
information-theoretic surprise. Testing for the representation of thosedependencies between trials and its potential physiological correlates,
such as skin conductance or pupil diameter, however, remains an inter-
esting area for future research.
In a previous study using a saccadic eyemovement task, surprise has
been associated with activity in the inferior posterior parietal cortex,
whereas model updating was associated with the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) (O'Reilly et al., 2013). While we partly replicated the ﬁnd-
ings of an ACC-involvement in model updating, we did not detect
any parietal activity for the unexpectedness of an observation. These
differences are likely to reﬂect the lack of a clearmotor planning compo-
nent to our task. Conversely, O'Reilly et al. do not report activity in the
midbrain relating to model-updating. While it is dangerous to over-
interpret a negative ﬁnding, one crucial difference is that in O'Reilly
et al. ‘surprise’ and ‘model-update’ trials were explicitly indicated,
whereas in our paradigm the epistemic value of feedback cues had to
be inferred. The aspect of inferring the epistemic value (meaningful in-
formation content) of a stimulus may be the crucial factor determining
an involvement of the dopaminergic system. Also the fact that we only
detected a weak signal in the ACC is likely to be due to the different na-
ture of tasks, such the ACC typically is more strongly involved in instru-
mental tasks (Matsumoto et al., 2007; O'Reilly et al., 2013; Rudebeck
et al., 2008) whereas our task only required subjects to make inferences
based on observations.
Our data provide the ﬁrst association between information signal-
ling and dopamine putative function in humans. Understanding
the link between dopamine and belief updating that implicates a selec-
tive sensitivity formeaningful information also sheds new light on ﬁnd-
ings that associate dopamine with signalling advance information
(Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009). In the light of our results,
dopamine-rich regions might be thought of in terms of encoding ad-
vance information not because information is inherently rewarding
per se. Instead advance information has epistemic value for an agent
in terms of inducing a shift in its beliefs. Our data, therefore, speak to a
direct association between dopamine and an agent's beliefs about the
world, predicting dopaminergic function will reﬂect a sensitivity for
meaningful information that affects beliefs.
Finally, understanding the link between dopamine and belief forma-
tion can provide crucial insight into how dopaminergic abnormalities in
conditions such as in schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorder and
addiction (Friston et al., 2014b; Howes et al., 2009; Howes et al., 2011a,
2011b; Kapur, 2003; Roiser et al., 2013; Schwartenbeck et al., 2014b;
Shaner, 1999). In particular, it is widely hypothesised that dysregulated
dopaminergic function leads to increased salience being conferred on
sensory stimuli, a step in a path leading to psychosis (Howes and
Kapur, 2009) (though the precise mechanisms by which this might
occur remain to be mapped out). Our results nuance this hypothesis
by suggesting that the increased salience conferred by dysregulated do-
paminergic activitymay be best understood in terms of the pathological
assignment of meaningfulness or epistemic value to sensations. This is
remarkably consistent with the phenomenology of prodromal psycho-
sis (the so-called ‘Truman sign’) (Fusar-Poli et al., 2008), and provides
an intriguing and potentially important topic for future research. By im-
plicating dopamine in signalling the meaningful information imparted
by an observation (or, equivalently, the degree of belief updating that
is necessary in response to it), our ﬁndings suggest new directions for
future theoretical and empirical work on the expression of aberrant
beliefs.
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